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Abstract
An extensive literature shows the importance of investment policy for sus-
tainability of resource-based economies by examining the role of investment
in current utility change (CUC) for a competitive optimizing economy. This
paper extends some of these results by analysing the dependence of CUC
on genuine investment (GI), expressed in marginal resource productivity,
under dynamic ine¢ ciency. The ine¢ ciency arises when a social planner,
due to imperfection in knowledge or in institutions, does not take into ac-
count deviations of real economy from a theoretical model. These devia-
tions or distortions, connected with the resource extraction, can inuence
utility, production, the balance equation, and the dynamics of the reserve.
The analysis of this natural discrepancy between theory and real life implies
that: rst, institutional and resource policies in ine¢ cient economies may be
more important for CUC than investment policy; and secondly, under uncer-
tainties in production possibilities and in damages from economic activities,
sustainability requires a more cautious resource policy than is advised by a
theory. The paper also suggests that the indicators GI, expressed in account-
Email address: bazhanov@yahoo.com (Andrei V. Bazhanov)
December 19, 2011
ing prices and in marginal resource productivity, can complement each other
in sustainability evaluation.
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1. Introduction1
Sustainability of real economies is always evaluated under uncertainties
in future production possibilities and in various distortions such as institu-
tional imperfections, economic wastefulness, damages from the processes of
production and consumption to utility and to production itself. These un-
certainties lead to the errors in the decisions of a social planner and cause
deviations from an e¢ cient and optimal path of economic development.
The literature on sustainability evaluation of resource-based economies
o¤ers an indicator of sustainable development, called genuine saving or gen-
uine investment (GI), which is equal to increase in man-made capital minus
resource depletion. This indicator was developed in the studies of the change
in the current (present) value of consumption or utility at a specic moment
of time in a dynamically e¢ cient optimizing economy. Straightforward ap-
plications of these results to real-world situations can form the impression
that, for sustainability, it is enough to invest in a proper way into man-made
and human capital regardless of the pattern of extraction.
The current paper extends some of these studies by assuming that a real
economy deviates from theoretical paths, but a planner, due to imperfection
in knowledge or in institutions, uses the policies developed for an undistorted
model. The paper provides the examples of distortions, which show that this
natural discrepancy between a model and real life results in dynamically
ine¢ cient paths and, in some cases, unsustainability of the economy.
1This study is a development of the authors paper Investment and resource policy
under a modied Hotelling rule.
3
The idea of the indicator GI was o¤ered in Hartwick (1977) as the in-
vest resource rent rule for the problem formulated in Solow (1974) for
the Dasgupta-Heal-Solow-Stiglitz (DHSS)2 model of a perfectly competitive
resource-based economy satisfying the standard Hotelling rule (HR) as a nec-
essary condition of dynamic e¢ ciency. For this model, zero GI with resource
depletion measured in market prices leads to constant per capita consump-
tion over time. Dixit et al. (1980) extended the Hartwick rule by showing
for a more general production function that GI that is constant over time
in present prices is a necessary and su¢ cient condition for a constant path
of utility.3 Dasgupta and Heal (1979, pp. 303-306), Hamilton and Hartwick
(2005), and Hamilton et al. (2006) analyzed the link between GI in current
prices and current change in per capita consumption. Hamilton and Witha-
gen (2007) derived the result of Dixit et al. (1980) (including also the result of
Hamilton and Hartwick (2005)) in a more general setting (with internalized
externalities), showing that instantaneous utility increases if and only if GI
decreases in present prices. All these results were obtained for a competitive
dynamically e¢ cient economy.
Besides theoretical studies, variants of the indicator GI were used for prac-
tical evaluation of sustainability. For example, Pearce and Atkinson (1993)
o¤ered a simple indicator of weak sustainability4 based on the assertion that
2This model with the Cobb-Douglas production function, which includes a nonrenew-
able resource as a production factor, was developed in the works of Dasgupta and Heal
(1974), Solow (1974), and Stiglitz (1974).
3Constant investment in present prices means that investment in current prices is grow-
ing with the rate of discount.
4Weak sustainability of growth (development) is dened by Pezzey (1992) as nonde-
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an economy is sustainable if it saves more than the combined depreciation
on the two forms of capital(man-made and natural). A variant of this in-
dicator, modied for open economies, has been developed in Proops et al.
(1999). These indicators were used in both papers to classify a number of
countries into sustainable and unsustainable. Hamilton and Clemens (1999)
developed a theory of genuine saving by adding the investment in human
capital to traditional net savings and subtracting the value of resource de-
pletion and environmental damage. The value of genuine saving was o¤ered
as an indicator of sustainability, and this indicator was used for comparing
sustainability of a wide range of developing countries. Hence, as Hamilton
and Hartwick (2005, p. 615) noted, the magnitude of net investmentor
genuine savingshas become a central focus in the measurement of the sus-
tainability of an economy.
Proposition 1 (Section 2) of this paper extends Proposition 1 of Hamil-
ton and Hartwick (2005), providing the link between GI and current utility
change (CUC) in a dynamically ine¢ cient economy. The result shows that:
1) CUC may be determined only by the inuence of ine¢ ciency when this in-
uence is not close to zero; 2) ine¢ ciency asymmetrically a¤ects the ability
of investment to inuence the sign of CUC, and this asymmetry is mutu-
ally inverted for large resource-poor and small resource-rich economies; 3)
resource-based economies can be classied by the importance of investment
or resource policies or both for CUC.
The examples of distortions (Section 3) include: 1) a resource-augmenting
creasing per capita consumption (utility).
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technical change (Takayama 1980) that distorts the optimal dynamics of the
resource stock and leads to a sustainable but dynamically ine¢ cient economy
when a planner does not take it into account; 2) irreversible damages to
utility and production resulting from the resource use (for example, Stollery
1998) that lead to ine¢ cient and unsustainable outcomes when the planner
ignores these e¤ects; and 3) insecure property rights (Arrow et al. 2003) that
also cause ine¢ cient use of the resource and unsustainability of the economy,
unless corrected by institutional transformations and resource policies.
The results of this study illustrate that, for sustainability, it is preferable
to underestimate future production possibilities and overestimate damages
since this policy of extra caution can reduce irreversible losses. Of course,
this policy may lead to dynamic ine¢ ciency caused by an overly conservative
resource policy, but with updates in knowledge, the policy can be corrected,
and the economy can be asymptotically e¢ cient.
This paper also shows that an indicator linked to CUC may be, by con-
struction, not sensitive to the changes in the ability of an economy to main-
tain non-declining utility during a long period of time (Section 4). According
to Arrow et al. (2003), the accounting price5 of a natural resource can be
considerably higher for imperfect economies than the market price, implying
that the investment of the market resource rent and even the entire marked-
valued output into man-made capital can be not enough to compensate for
damages caused by the resource extraction. In other words, GI in account-
ing prices can be negative despite any e¤ort in saving, suggesting that for
5The accounting price of the resource stock shows the change in the intergenerational
welfare when the resource stock is changed by one unit.
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some ine¢ cient economies, institutional and resource policies are prerequi-
sites of sustainability. On the other hand, GI in accounting prices, also by
construction, may be not sensitive to CUC, which also may lead to violations
of sustainability. Therefore, di¤erent forms of GI can complement each other
in sustainability evaluation.
2. Investment and growth under dynamic ine¢ ciency
In order to dene a distorted economy, it is instructive to introduce rst
a perfect or undistorted optimizing economy. Following Hamilton and
Hartwick (2005, p. 618), assume that the economy is closed, time t is contin-
uous, consumption is aggregated into a single good C; labor is xed, so that
output Q(t) = F (K;R) depends on man-made capital K(t) and the resource
ow R(t) =   _S(t); where S(t) is the current resource stock ( _S := dS=dt).
The technology is stationary (F does not depend explicitly on t).
A number of studies, which results were used for practical evaluation of
sustainability, assume that the economy satises the following:
 F (K;R) is a regular production function that (a) denotes the maximum
output for the given K and R; and (b) satises the Inada conditions, in
particular FR > 0 (resource productiveness), where FR := @F=@R;
 output Q equals F (K;R) (static e¢ ciency);6
 the balance equation holds: C + _K = F (K;R)   K; where _K is
investment and K with  = const is capital decay (non-wastefulness);
6Conventionally, e¢ ciency is dened via the Pareto-optimality. Some studies, e.g.
Hurwicz (1960), called this notion non-wastefulness.
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 the standard HR _FR = rFR7 holds as a necessary condition of dynamic
e¢ ciency;
 the economy (a planner) maximizes a (social) welfare function by choos-
ing the paths of _K and R (optimality).
In the real world, however, the resource use can be
non-productive (FR = 0) or counter-productive (FR < 0);8
productive, but static-ine¢ cient (Q < F (K;R));
productive, static-e¢ cient, but wasteful: (C + _K < F (K;R)  K);
productive, static-e¢ cient, non-wasteful, but dynamically ine¢ cient;
productive, non-wasteful, e¢ cient, but not optimal.
This paper assumes that there is a vectorD(t) = (D1(t); D2(t); D3(t); D4(t));
called distortion, where Di are the distortions in
production: F = F (K;R;D1); (1)
social utility: U = U(C;D2); (2)
the balance equation: _K = F (K;R;D1)  C   K  D3; (3)
the dynamics of the stock: _S =  R +D4: (4)
The distortions may include imperfections, externalities, and any e¤ects (in-
cluding favorable for sustainability) that cause violation of the standard HR.
To illustrate the claims of this study, it is enough to accept the following
Assumptions: 1) D depends only on the extracted amount S0 S(t) or
7Here, r(t) := FK(t)   is the market interest rate.
8The resource use is counter-productive when the decline in the resource stock results
in the decline of output, e.g., as a result of a wildre or oil spill.
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2)D depends on some parameters that do not depend on time explicitly.9
Hence, D do not depend here on R;10 K; and C: For example, D1 and D2
may result from irreversible damages caused by economic activities (stock
externalities, for example, due to climate change); D3 may stand for the
growing cost of extraction (best-quality stock extracted rst) or for static
ine¢ ciency and (or) for wastefulness of the economy (D3 > 0); D4 may be
the productivity of the stock-augmenting investment, which is, rst, growing
with the extraction due to learning-by-doing and eventually declining due to
the scarcity of the resource.
Let D5 be a deviation of the ratio _FR=FR from a dynamically e¢ cient
path. Then the following result holds.
Lemma 1. In economy (1)-(4),
_FR = [v(t) + (t)]FR; (5)
9D may depend, e.g., on the parameters that express institutional imperfections.
10In fact, D may depend on R; e.g., when damage includes the opportunity cost (Gaudet
et al., 2006), or when damage is partly reversible. Then formula (6) below is more com-
plicated, which, however, does not alter the conclusions of the paper. D can also de-
pend on the amount of non-extracted resource, e.g., when the stock has an amenity value
(DAutume, Schubert, 2008). Then, if this value can be expressed in terms of utility,
the problem can be reformulated by introducing the damage resulted from the resource
extraction. In practice, this approach can be more precise, since the uncertainty in the
extracted amount is essentially less than in the remaining stock. A review of studies with
the modied HR can be found, e.g., in Gaudet (2007).
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where v(t) := FK   ;11 (t)12=  [D(t)] := D5 + @D4=@(S0   S)
+
1
FR

UD2@D2=@(S0   S)
UC
+ FD1
@D1
@(S0   S)  
@D3
@(S0   S)

; (6)
and D5 = 0 if the economy is dynamically e¢ cient.
Proof is in Appendix 1.
In this framework, dynamic e¢ ciency is a relative notion. The planners
optimal path may be dynamically ine¢ cient with respect to a rst-best so-
lution, for example, because the planner underestimates future production
possibilities and considers the rst-best path as infeasible (Section 3.1). The
planners optimal path may also appear ine¢ cient when the planner does not
account for the resource use externalities while estimating social progress. In
the latter case, the planner may even consider the rst-best path as ine¢ cient
due to the di¤erence between the units of measure for utility in the planners
and in the rst-best solutions (Section 3.2).
Deviation D5 may depend on D; for example, on D4 when a planner does
not take into account resource-augmenting investments (D5 =  @D4=@(S0 
S); Section 3.1), or on D1 and D2 when the planner ignores the damages
from the resource extraction (Section 3.2). In some cases, however, D5 may
not depend on D; and instead, both D5 and D may be determined by the
same phenomena, for example, imperfect institution (Section 3.3).
11v(t) is the market interest rate only with no distortion.
12(t) is the additive HR modier or the inuence of D: This inuence in equation (5)
can be expressed in a multiplicative form: _FR = v [D]FR; where  [D] := 1 +  [D] =v:
With no distortion,  = 0:
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Genuine investment dened in Hamilton and Hartwick (2005) is
G(t) := _K(t) + _S(t)FR(t): (7)
This measure includes not only current investment into man-made capital
but the value of the currently extracted resource estimated in marginal re-
source productivity, which, with no distortion, coincides with the market
price. Hence, G indicates a combination of investment and resource policies.
Since utility may be distorted by D2; the dependence of utility on con-
sumption may be nonmonotonic; therefore, consumption cannot substitute
utility as a measure of well-being (see, for example, Section 3.2). Hence, the
proposition below establishes the link between G and _U; which includes the
link between G and _C as a special case.
Proposition 1. Current utility change is
_U = (v   _G=G)GUC +	; (8)
where 	 := _SFRUCD5 is the inuence of dynamic ine¢ ciency.
Proof is in Appendix 2.
In a particular case, when the economy is dynamically e¢ cient (D5 = 	 =
0), formula (8) can be obtained from the results of Dixit et al. (1980) and
Hamilton and Withagen (2007), expressed in present prices (see the proof).
With no distortion, formula (8) coincides with the result of Hamilton and
Hartwick (2005). In the general case, equation (8) shows that investment
(7) can indeed determine _U if 	 is relatively small. However, _U can be also
completely determined by 	 when the term

v   _G=G

GUC is close to zero.
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Of course, sharp changes in G can determine an instant sign of _U despite
the large values of 	: Formula (8) shows that if there is a t = t; such that
	(t) has a large positive (negative) value, _U(t) can be negative (positive)
if G(t) is negative (positive) and _G(t)=G(t) has a large positive (negative)
value. However, these cases are not relevant to sustainability due to the
boundedness of investments, whereas distortions in general are less restricted.
The boundedness of investment implies that the larger is 	; the shorter is
the period of time when these cases are possible. Therefore, neglecting the
short-run oscillations, it can be assumed, for determinateness, that
 _G=G <
v < 1;13 where v > 0; and the current investment _K is bounded by the
current output Q: Then a feasible investment can be dened as follows.
Denition 1. Investment _K(t) = w(t)Q(t) is feasible if w(t) 2 (0; 1) and
j _G=Gj < v for any t > 0:
Denition 1 results in the following Corollary.
Corollary 1. Equation (8) implies that, for a feasible investment,
(I) _U R 0 i¤
	 R  

v   _G=G

GUC ; or G R   _SFRD5=

v   _G=G

; or (9)
D5
8<: Q  

v   _G=G

_K=

_SFR

+ 1

; when _S < 0;
R  

v   _G=G

_K=

_SFR

+ 1

; when _S > 0;
(10)
13The analysis can be easily complemented by the case with
 _G=G > v:
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(II) a feasible investment policy can change the sign of _U i¤
 

v   _G
G

<
 

v   _G
G

Q
_SFR
+ 1

<
9=;D5
8<: <  

v   _G
G

Q
_SFR
+ 1

; when _S < 0;
<  

v   _G
G

; when _S > 0:
(11)
The following examples show that the impact of dynamic ine¢ ciency on
the e¢ cacy of investment depends on the level of output and the share of
the resource rent in output. Assume that D4 = 0 ( _S < 0); v = 0:06 and
_G=G = 0:03 at t > 0:
(a) Large resource-poor economy. Let Q(t) = 101 and _S(t)FR(t) =
 1: Then (Corollary 1) an investment policy can change the sign of _U(t) i¤
 0:03 < D5 < 3:
(b) Small resource-rich economy. In the case with Q(t) = 11 and
_S(t)FR(t) =  10; an investment policy can a¤ect the sign of _U(t) i¤
 0:03 < D5 < 0:003:
It is intuitive that a large economy has more opportunities in investment
than a small one, and so the range for D5; in which investment is able to
a¤ect the sign of utility change, is larger in case (a) than in case (b). Another
di¤erence between these two cases is that investment in a large resource-
poor economy can change the sign of _U mostly when D5 a¤ects _U negatively
(positive D5 reduces _U when _S < 0). In this example, the range of D5 > 0; in
which investment is able to compensate for the damage from the ine¢ ciency,
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is 100 times larger than the range of D5 < 0; which positive e¤ect on _U
can be annihilated by negative G: This asymmetry is inverted in a small
resource-rich economy.
Assume that _S < 0:14 Then boundedness of investments implies that the
current states of economies along the planners paths belong to the one of the
four following types determined by di¤erent roles of resource (institutional)
and investment policies in the current change of utility depending on the
level of ine¢ ciency D5:
(A) D5 >  

v   _G=G
 h
Q=

_SFR

+ 1
i
: utility declines regardless of
investment; non-negative values of _U can be obtained only by reduction of
the ine¢ ciency if it is still possible.15
(B) 0 < D5 <  

v   _G=G
 h
Q=

_SFR

+ 1
i
: utility growth can be
achieved by investment policy alone; the optimal saving rate may be higher
than under 	 = 0 in order to compensate not only for the shrinking natural
capital but for the negative e¤ect of ine¢ ciency (for example, van der Ploeg
2011). Without a policy reducing D5; the level of utility may be lower than
under 	 = 0:
(C)  

v   _G=G

< D5 < 0 : utility growth can be achieved by invest-
ment policy alone; the optimal saving rate may be lower than under 	 = 0
due to the positive e¤ect from D5; decline in utility is still possible when
14The inequalities below are inverted when _S > 0: An example that allows for the
growing reserve stock is provided in Section 3.1. The case with _S > 0 may lead to some
interesting implications that require a separate study.
15Possibility of reduction of ine¢ ciency depends on the state of the economy with respect
to tipping points. This problem is not considered in the present paper.
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G <   _SFRD5=

v   _G=G

< 0:
(D) D5 <  

v   _G=G

: utility grows regardless of investments; invest-
ment policy is important as a determinant of the level of utility along the
growing path.
Types C and D may correspond to an economy where the planner under-
estimates future production possibilities (Section 3.1).
Condition (9) shows that, for 	 < 0; the minimum investment G that
provides non-declining utility can be essentially higher than zero. The next
section shows that the value of G guaranteeing _U > 0 may not exist.
3. Dynamic ine¢ ciency and sustainability: Examples
In the examples below, D5 denotes a deviation of the ratio _FR=FR along
the planners optimal path from a rst-best path and eD5  a deviation
of the rst-best path from the planners optimal path (D5 =   eD5). For
succinctness, the planners optimal paths and the models that do not take
into account some of the distortions are called below undistorted.
3.1. Resource-augmenting technical change
Assume that in a real economy, D4 is the only distortion, namely, _S =
 R + S(LR=L);16 where LR=L is the share of the resource-augmenting re-
search sector and () > 0 is the rate of growth of the resource stock due to
research (Takayama, 1980). According to (6), this problem yields condition
(5) with  =  :
16Note that when  > R=S; the distortion D4 results in _S > 0:
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Assume also that a social planner does not use the information about
 and works with the undistorted model. Then, from the planners point
of view, the dynamics of the real economy without government interven-
tion is non-optimal with eD5 =  ;17 which corresponds to the type C or
D (depending on the behavior of ) with growing consumption when G >
_SFR=

v   _G=G

(the investment G may be negative here when _S < 0). In
fact, the reduced optimalplanners paths of resource extraction and con-
sumption are dynamically ine¢ cient withD5 =   eD5 =  @D4=@(S0 S) = ;
and if D4 and a correspondent increment in consumption are taken into ac-
count, then D5  0 and consumption grows only when G > 0: Hence, in
this example, the discrepancy between theory and real life results in a sus-
tainable but ine¢ cient path. Dynamic ine¢ ciency can be reduced only by
adjustment of the resource policy when the planner updates the informa-
tion about reserve estimates. This adjustment can result in sustainable and
asymptotically e¢ cient economy.
3.2. Irreversible damages to utility and production
Assume that a social utility and production in a real economy are nega-
tively a¤ected by the damage D = D1 = D2 caused by a stock externality18
(D(S0 S) > 0; UD < 0; FD < 0). If a planner disregards the damage, then,
according to Lemma 1, the planners paths are dynamically ine¢ cient with
D5 =  (FD + UD=UC)D(S0 S)=FR > 0:19 The planners problem reduces in
17Utility is not distorted here (UD2 = 0); hence, formula (8) becomes _C =
v   _G=G

G+ _SFRD5; since _U = UC _C + UD2 _D2:
18E.g., D may result from irreversible climate change (Stollery, 1998).
19As usual, UC > 0:
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this case to the one of Solow (1974) - Hartwick (1977), where, under the max-
imin criterion, the path of extraction starts from a higher level than in the
e¢ cient case,20 and the economy follows a constant-consumption path (due
to G = 0) with a higher level than the initial level of the e¢ cient path. Since
for the planner, UD = FD = 0; formula (8) becomes _C =

v   _G=G

G:
In reality, however, the change in well-being is21
_U =

v   _G=G

GUC + (FDUC + UD) _D; (12)
which is negative under the undistorted paths of investment and extraction
(G = 0) since (FDUC + UD) _D < 0: Denote   = min _G=G for all feasible G:
Then, according to Corollary 1, investment G that provides _U > 0 does not
exist when the damage is large, namely, when
(FDUC + UD) _D <   (v    )

Q+ _SFR

< 0:
Hence, the undistorted policies result in ine¢ ciency and unsustainability of
this economy.
The growth of utility can be achieved in this case only when the planner
recognizes the damage and reconsiders the measure of progress in the society.
This done, the planner, situated in the Solow-Hartwick case, can obtain a
sustainable and rst-best optimal path by changing the resource policy alone,
20When damage a¤ects only production, Stollery (1998, p. 735) showed that the optimal
extraction starts from a lower initial level and declines slower than in the case with no
damage. The same result for damage in utility was obtained in Bazhanov (2011a, formula
(33), Fig. 4).
21Formula (12) can be obtained from formula (8) using the expression for D5 and the
fact that _D =   _SD(S0 S):
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namely, by reducing extraction, while the investment rule remains the same.22
3.3. Insecure property rights
Following Arrow et al. (2003, p. 664), assume that the owner i (i =
1 : : : N ;N > 2) extracts a liquid resource from the pool with the stock Si:
All N owners are identical, non-cooperative, and the pools are separated by
porous barriers. The resource di¤uses from larger pools to smaller ones with
the same rate  > 0:23 Then the depletion equations are
_Si = 
X
j 6=i
(Sj   Si) Ri; i = 1:::N;
where Ri = Ri(t) is the rate of extraction of the owner i at the moment t: The
necessary conditions for PV-maximization of the each owners utility yield
equation (5) with   D5 = (N   1) > 0 (socially e¢ cient paths require
N = 1). This ine¢ ciency results in the distorted path of extraction
RD =
PN
i=1Ri = [(+D5) =]S0e
 (+D5)t=
with the higher initial rate RD(0) and faster decline _RD than for the e¢ cient
path
R = [=]S0e
 t=:
In these formulas,  > 0 is the social discount rate, and  > 1  the
elasticity of marginal utility. Hence, the distorted equation for the whole
reserve is _S =  R + D4; where D4 = R   RD: In this example, D4 does
not depend directly on the extracted resource S0 S; and deviation D5 does
22Stollery (1998) showed that the Hartwick rule (G = 0) is still optimal in this economy.
23No barriers corresponds to !1:
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not depend on D4; both these distortions result from imperfect institutions,
expressed in N > 2 and  > 0:24
Let v = 0:06; and _G=G =  0:04: Since _S < 0 and D5 > 0 for any t > 0;
a feasible investment policy can change the sign of _U i¤ (Corollary 1)
(N   1) <  0:1
h
Q=

_SFR

+ 1
i
> 0:
When this condition is not satised, only institutional changes and resource
policies can prevent decline in utility. An investment provides not declining
utility here i¤
G >  10(N   1) _SFR > 0 or w >   [10(N   1)+ 1]

_SFR=Q

;
which is very restrictive for N > 1:
It is illustrative to consider two cases.
(a) Large resource-poor economy (Q = 101; _SFR =  1). In this case,
_K can change the sign of _U i¤ (N   1) < 10; which means, for example,
that, for  = 1; utility declines for any investment (type A) if N > 11: Let
24Formally, the link D5(D4) is D5 =     (=t)W

D4t=S0   (t=) e (t=)

; where
W [] is the Lambert W function. Numerically, using computational software (e.g., Maple),
this formula gives D5 = (N   1) for any t when arg fW []g >  1=e: Also, formally, D4
changes with S0   S(t); since both are changing in time. However, it can be shown that
D4 cannot be represented as a function of S0   S only. Namely, the assumption D4 =
D4 (S0   S) ; given  ; the expression D4 = R  RD; and using Lemma 1, results in D4 =
(N   1) (S0   S) + D4(0); since D1 = D2 = D3 = 0: Here, D4(0) =   (N   1)S0=:
However, since the reserve S0 is xed, D4 must result only in intertemporal redistribution
of the resource, namely, the condition
R1
0
D4dt = 0 must hold, which is not true for D4
derived in this way.
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N = 5: Then the saving rate, compensating for the shrinking resource and
ine¢ ciency, should be no less than wmin = 41101 (or G=Q >
40
101
), whereas with
no distortion (N = 1), utility grows for any w > 1
101
(or G > 0).
(b) Small resource-rich economy (Q = 11; _SFR =  10). _K can change
the sign of _U i¤ (N   1) < 0:01; for example, for  > 0:01 and N > 2;
utility declines regardless of any feasible investment. Let  = 0:009 and
N = 2: Then not declining utility is possible when almost all output is being
invested, namely, w > 10:9
11
; although, for this resource-dependent economy,
even with no distortion (N = 1), the saving rate yielding at least constant
utility must be very high, namely, wmin =   _SFR=Q  0:91:
Hence, the use of the policies for the undistorted model in this example
also results in ine¢ ciency and unsustainability; moreover, a feasible invest-
ment compensating for the ine¢ ciency and providing non-declining current
utility may not exist.
4. Indicator GI and sustainability evaluation
This section briey discusses some questions that arise in the use of var-
ious forms of indicator GI in sustainability evaluation.
(a) Aggregate consumption. Proposition 1 can be generalized in a straight-
forward way for n resources. Then formula (7) becomes
G(t) := _K(t) +
nX
i=1
_Si(t)FRi(t); (13)
and, applying the same approach for the proof, the combined inuence of all
the ine¢ ciencies on utility is
	 := UC
nX
i=1
_SiFRiD5i: (14)
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Equations (8) and (14) show that when utility depends on the aggregate
consumption, the combined e¤ect of all D5i on _U may be positive despite
the unsustainable extraction of some resources. The problem originates from
the assumption that the components of consumption are substitutes.25 This
assumption implies a specic aggregation of all D5i; and this aggregation
may not adequately reect the impact of each source of ine¢ ciency on _U: For
example, if two resources are not substitutes in production (oil and copper),
then, according to formula (14), a common pool situation for one resource can
be compensated by the resource-augmenting investment for another resource.
An indicator using this aggregation will show that the current utility should
grow, despite the known problems in the future.
(b) Disaggregate consumption. A utility function that depends on a num-
ber of factors26 is supposed to be more accurate for sustainability evaluation
than a function that depends on aggregate consumption, but only if the speci-
cation of this function adequately reects the preferences of a representative
agent. The problems with the use of this function result, rst, from complex-
ities in dening empirically well-grounded functional forms of dependence of
U on each factor, and, secondly, from increasing technical work in theoretical
estimations. For example, the proof of Proposition 1 would require splitting
the balance equation on industries that correspond to the consumption
25This assumption is consistent with measuring social progress in terms of GDP all
components of consumption enter GDP in the same money units. In fact, some components
of consumption, e.g. transport, food, and health, are not substitutes.
26For this kind of function, _U =
P
i UCi
_Ci +
P
j UD2j
_D2j ; where each Ci a¤ects utility
positively and D2j negatively.
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components.
(c) Indicators GI based on CUC and on change in intergenerational wel-
fare. Indicator GI based on CUC may not show the change in the ability of
an economy to maintain non-declining utility during a long period of time.
For example, in the DHSS economy (Q = F (K;R) = KR), indicator (7)
expressed as a share of GDP takes the form G=Q = w   ; where w is the
rate of investment ( _K = wQ). Assume, for simplicity, that utility monoton-
ically depends on consumption (no damages). An economic program with
non-declining consumption exists in this economy at t = t0 if and only if27
G1=Qjt=t0 := w  KR= [S0Q (  )] jt=t0 > 0: (15)
Hence, this economy is potentially sustainable at t = t0 (a program with
non-declining utility exists) if and only if R(t0)=S0 6 wQ (  ) = [K] jt=t0 ;
which means that potential sustainability can be achieved by a change in
resource policy only, regardless of the value of G=Qjt=t0 and the sign of _C(t0):
The indicators G and G1 coincide if and only if the state of the economy
satises a perfectioncondition (R=S0 = Q (  ) =K) with respect to a
constant-consumption criterion (Bazhanov 2010).
On the other hand, the indicator G1 does not reect CUC and current
level of consumption (utility). As a result, a positive value of this indicator
may approve a sharp decline in the current rate of resource extraction,
27Derivation of the expression for G1; which is called the level of potential sustainability,
is provided in Bazhanov (2011b). This expression coincides with the indicator GI where
the resource price shows the change in the maximum level of consumption that can be
maintained forever.
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which may lead to a drop in the current level of utility below a subsistence
minimum violating intergenerational justice. Of course, unsustainability of
an economy (G1 < 0) requires changes in investment and resource policies to
increase the value of G1; but this requirement raises the questions: 1) what
is the maximum value of G1 for an optimal economic growth, and 2) what
is the path of acceptable sacrices in current utility for future sustainable
development?
5. Concluding remarks
This study assumed that a social planner of a resource-based economy
constructed optimal paths using a model that is not su¢ ciently adequate to
the problem, for example, due to imperfection in knowledge or in institutions.
In order to imitate this discrepancy between theory and real life, the study
has extended the result of Hamilton and Hartwick (2005) regarding the role
of genuine investment (GI) in current utility change (CUC) by assuming that
1) there are distortions that a¤ect utility, production, balance equation, and
the dynamics of the resource stock; and 2) the planner does not take into
account some of these distortions. As a result, the planners paths are only
second-best optimal and dynamically ine¢ cient. Proposition 1 shows the
link between GI and CUC depending on the inuence of this ine¢ ciency.
Proposition 1 and Corollary 1 have shown that CUC can be determined
by GI, measured in the marginal resource productivity, only when the in-
uence of the disregarded distortions is close to zero. These results entail a
classication of the status of a resource-based economy by the importance
of investment or resource policies or both for CUC. The study has shown
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that the distortions asymmetrically a¤ect the ability of investment to control
CUC, and this asymmetry is mutually inverted for capital-rich-resource-poor
and capital-poor-resource-rich economies.
The examples of neglected distortions demonstrated that a dynamically
ine¢ cient economy may be sustainable, when the planner underestimates
future production possibilities, or unsustainable, when the planner ignores
institutional imperfections or damages from economic activities. The exam-
ples also have shown that in the presence of ine¢ ciencies, a feasible level of
GI that provides a positive CUC may not exist.
Since, by the denition, an economy is unsustainable if utility declines at
any moment of time (including the current moment), the results of this study
imply that for sustainability of real economies, 1) institutional and resource
policies may be more important than investment policies when the level of
ine¢ ciency is high; 2) it is preferable that a resource policy is more conser-
vative than is prescribed by a theory. In the former conclusion, investment
policy, of course, is still important as a determinant of the level of utility
along a growing or declining path and as a determinant of growth when the
level of ine¢ ciency is low. In the latter one, an overly conservative resource
policy may result in dynamic ine¢ ciency, but with updates in knowledge, the
policy can be corrected, and the economy can be asymptotically e¢ cient.
Besides regular consequences caused by deviation of real life from theory,
an indicator based on CUC may not reect sustainability of an economy,
because, by construction, it does not show the change in the ability of the
economy to maintain non-declining utility during a long period of time. Ac-
cording to Arrow et al. (2003), in order to evaluate current sustainability
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change, the accounting prices should be used for measuring GI. However, an
indicator GI based on these prices may not reect CUC, which may result in
an increase in the long-term welfare at the cost of an unacceptable decline
in current utility, violating the principles of sustainability and intergenera-
tional justice. The properties of di¤erent forms of indicator GI imply that
these indicators can complement each other in sustainability evaluation, or
another indicator (or algorithm of sustainability evaluation) that is consis-
tent with a criterion of intergenerational justice at any moment of time can
be constructed.
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7. Appendix 1. Proof of Lemma 1
Since optimal paths are always e¢ cient, a necessary condition of dynamic
e¢ ciency for economy (1)-(4) can be obtained from optimality conditions, for
example, in the problem of PV-maximization28 of
R1
0
U(C;D2)(t)dt with a
discount factor (t): The Hamiltonian of this problem is H = U(C;D2)(t)+
K(F   C   K   D3) + S(D4   R); and the Pontryagin-type necessary
28The maximin, formulated as maxr;c
R1
0
Ue tdt  U = const(r; c) with the addi-
tional constraint U(C;D2) = U; yields the same result.
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conditions are
HC = UC(t)  K = 0; (16)
HR = KFR   S = 0; (17)
_K =  
@H
@K
=  K (FK   ) ; (18)
_S =  
@H
@S
=  (t)UD2
@D2
@ (S0   S)
@ (S0   S)
@S
 
K

FD1
@D1
@ (S0   S)
@ (S0   S)
@S
  @D3
@ (S0   S)
@ (S0   S)
@S

 
S
@D4
@ (S0   S)
@ (S0   S)
@S
: (19)
Equation (19) with K from (16) becomes
_S = (t)UD2D2(S0 S) +
UC(t)

FD1D1(S0 S)  D3(S0 S)

+ SD4(S0 S) : (20)
The time derivative of equation (17) is _S = _KFR + K _FR; which, com-
bined with (20), results in
_KFR + K _FR = (t)
h
UD2D2(S0 S) + UC

FD1D1(S0 S)  D3(S0 S)
i
+
SD4(S0 S) :
The last equation after dividing through by FR and substitutions for _K
(from (18)) and S (from (17)) becomes
 K (FK   ) + K
_FR
FR
=
(t)
FR
h
UD2D2(S0 S) + UC

FD1D1(S0 S)  D3(S0 S)
i
+
KD4(S0 S) ;
which, divided through by K with substitution for K from (16), yields
_FR=FR = FK    +  (D) ; where  (D) is dened by formula (6)
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8. Appendix 2. Proof of Proposition 1
The proof follows the approach of Hamilton and Hartwick (2005, Propo-
sition 1), which was rst applied in Hartwick (1977). The di¤erences are
that the current proof uses: 1) utility as a measure of well-being (due to
distortion D2); 2) a modied HR to substitute for _FR instead of the standard
HR. Namely, equations (1), (3), and (5) give
_C = _KFK + _RFR + _D1FD1    _K   K   _D3
= _KFK + _RFR + _D1FD1    _K   K   _D3 +R _FR  R _FR
= (FK   ) _K   (FK    + )FRR 
h
K   d (RFR) =dt
i
+ _D1FD1   _D3:
From (4), R =   _S +D4: Then
_C = (FK   ) _K   (FK    + )FR

  _S +D4

 
h
K   d
n
  _S +D4

FR
o
=dt
i
+ _D1FD1   _D3
= (FK   ) _K + (FK   )FR _S   (FK   )FRD4   FRR
 
h
K + d
n
_SFR
o
=dt
i
+ d fD4FRg =dt + _D1FD1   _D3
or, by the denition of G given in (7),
_C = vG  _G  vFRD4 + _D4FR +D4 _FR + _D1FD1   _D3   FRR: (21)
Substitution for _FR from (5) yields
_C = vG  _G+ FRD4 + _D4FR + _D1FD1   _D3   FRR;
which, using (4), becomes
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_C = vG  _G+ _D4FR + _D1FD1   _D3 + FR _S: (22)
Assumptions 1 and 2 imply that _Di =   _S@Di=@(S0   S): Then, using
Lemma 1,
FR _S = D5FR _S   _D4FR   _D1FD1 + _D3   UD2 _D2=UC :
Substitution of this expression into (22) results in
_C = vG  _G  UD2 _D2=UC +D5FR _S;
which, after substitution into _U = UC _C + UD2 _D2; yields formula (8) of the
proposition.
When economy (1)-(4) is dynamically e¢ cient (D5 = 0), formula (8) can
be obtained from the result of Dixit et al. (1980, Theorem 1) or from a
generalization of this result in Hamilton and Withagen (2007). Namely, in
terms of the present value prices of utility, capital, and the resource, dened
in Lemma 1 as (t); K ; and S; these results claim that
(t) _U =   d
dt

K _K + S _S

;
which, using formulas (16)-(18), can be rewritten as follows:
(t) _U =   d
dt

K

_K +
S
K
_S

=   d
dt
h
K

_K + FR _S
i
=   d
dt
[KG] =  K

_K
K
G+ _G

= K
h
(FK   )G  _G
i
:
Then, with the use of formula (16) and the notation v := FK   , it becomes
_U =

v   _G=G

GUC ;
which is formula (8) for D5 = 0
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